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Abstract:  
We analyze involuntary unemployment based on consumers’ utility maximization and firms’ profit maximization 
behavior with ongoing nominal wage rate decline. We consider a three-periods overlapping generations (OLG) 
model with a childhood period as well as younger and older periods under monopolistic competition with 
increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale technology. We examine the existenbce of involuntary 
unemployment in that model with ongoing mominal wage rate decline (or deflation). Even if the nominal wage 
rate declines, we have a steady state with involuntary unemployment and constant output and employment. 
We need budget deficit or budget surplus to maintain the steady state depending on whether real balance 
effect is positive or negative. Also we examine the possibility to achieve full-employment by fiscal policy. 
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1  Introduction 
 
 In this paper we examine the existence of involuntary unemployment with ongoing nominal wage 
rate decline under monopolistic competiton. Involuntary unemployment is a phenomenon that 
workers are willing to work at the market wage or just below but are prevented by factors beyond 
their control, mainly, deficiency of aggregate demand. Umada (1997) derived an upward-sloping 
labor demand curve from the mark-up principle for firms, and argued that such an upward-sloping 
labor demand curve leads to the existence of involuntary unemployment without wage rigidity 
(Lavoie (2001) presented a similar analysis.). But his model of firm behavior is ad-hoc. Otaki (2009) 
says that there exists involuntary unemployment for two reasons: (i) the nominal wage rate is set 
above the reservation nominal wage rate; and (ii) the employment level and economic welfare 
never improve by lowering the nominal wage rate. He assume indivisibility (or inelasticity) of 
individual labor supply, and has shown the existence of involuntary unemployment using efficient 
wage bargaining according to McDonald and Solow (1981). The arguments of this paper, however, 
do not depend on bargaining. If labor supply is indivisible, it may be 1 or 0. On the other hand, if it is 
divisible, it takes a real value between 0 and 1. As discussed by Otaki (2015) (Theorem 2.3) and 
Otaki (2012), if the labor supply is divisible and very small, no unemployment exists (About 
indivisible labor supply also please see Hansen (1985)). However, we show that even if labor 
supply is divisible, unless it is so small, there may exist involuntary unemployment. We consider 
consumers’ utility maximization and firms’ profit maximization in an overlapping generations (OLG) 
model under monopolistic competition according to Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011, 2015), and 
demonstrate the existence of involuntary unemployment without the assumption of wage rigidity. 
In the next section we show the existence of involuntary unemployment under monopolistic 
competition with increasing or decreasing or constant returns to scale technology using a three-
periods OLG model with a childhood period as well as younger (working) and older (retired) periods. 
Also we consider pay-as-you go pension system for the older generation. In a simple two-periods 
OLG model declines in the nominal wage rate and the price of goods may increase consumption and 
employment by the real balance effect. In such a model consumers have savings for future 
consumption, but no debt. In a three-periods model with childhood period they consume goods in 
their childhood period by borrowing money from (employed) consumers of the previous generation 
and scholarships, and must repay their debts in the next period. Real value of the debt is increased 
by declines in the nominal wage rate and the price. In addition to this configuration we consider a 
pay-as-you go pension system for the older generation which may reduce the savings of consumers. 
Then, consumptions and employment may decrease by falling of the nominal wage rate. We think 
that our model is more general and realistic than a simple two-periods OLG model.  
 In Section 3 we examine the effects of ongoing decline in the nominal wage rate and the price. In 
our three-periods OLG model with pay-as-you-go pension increases in consumption and employment 
due to declines in the nominal wage rate and the price of goods might be negative, that is, there may 
be negative real balance effect. The positive real balance effect is the fact that a decline in the nominal 
wage rate increases consumption, and the negative real balance effect means that a decline in the 
nominal wage rate decreases consumption. The real balance effect is positive (or negative) when the 
difference between the savings of the older generation consumers net of the pay-as-you-go pensions 
and the debt of the younger generation consumers is positive (or negative). Whether a budget deficit 
or a budget surplus is needed to maintain a steady state with constant income and employment and 
ongoing nominal wage rate decline depends on whether the real balance effect is positive or negative. 
Also we examine the possibility to achieve and maintain full-employment by fiscal policy. 
As we will state in the concluding remarks, the main limitation of this paper is that the goods are 
produced by only labor and there exists no capital and investment of firms. A study of the problem of 
involuntary unemployment in such a situation is the theme of future research. 
This paper is a generalization of some recent our papers, Tanaka (2020a) and (2020b), in which we 
analyze the existence of involuntary unemployment under perfect competition with indivisible labor 
supply. 
Schultz (1992) showed that there does not exist involuntary unemployment in an overlapping 
generations model. His arguments depends on positive real balance effect on consumption of the 
older generation consumers. We consider a three-periods overlapping generations model with pay-
as-you go pension to explore the possibility of negative real balance effect.  
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2  Existence of involuntary unemployment 
 
2.1  Consumers 
 
We consider a three-periods (0: childhood, 1: younger or working, and 2: older or retired) OLG model 
under monopolistic competition. It is a re-arrangement and an extension of the model put forth by 
Otaki (2007), (2009), (2012). The structure of our model is as follows.   
 1.  There is one factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of perishable goods indexed 
by 𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. Good 𝑧 is monopolistically produced by firm 𝑧 with increasing or decreasing or 
constant returns to scale technology.  
 2.  Consumers consume the goods during the childhood period (Period 0). This consumption is 
covered by borrowing money from (employed) consumers of the younger generation and/or 
scholarships. They must repay these debts in their Period 1. However, unemployed consumers 
cannot repay their own debts. Therefore, we assume that unemployed consumers receive 
unemployment benefits from the government, which are covered by taxes on employed consumers 
of the younger generation. 
 3.  During Period 1, consumers supply 𝑙 units of labor, repay the debts and save money for their 
consumption in Period 2. They also pay taxes for the pay-as-you go pension system for the older 
generation. 
 4.  During Period 2, consumers consume the goods using their savings carried over from their 
Period 1 earnings and the pay-as-you go pension, which is a lump-sum payment. It is covered by 
taxes on employed consumers of the younger generation. 
 5.  Consumers determine their consumptions in Periods 1 and 2 and the labor supply at the 
beginning of Period 1. We assume that their consumption during the childhood period is constant.  
 We use the following notation. 
 𝐶𝑖𝑒: consumption basket of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝐶𝑖𝑢: consumption basket of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑐𝑖𝑒(𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑐𝑖𝑢(𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝐷: consumption basket of an individual in the childhood period, which is constant. 𝑃𝑖: the price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑝𝑖(𝑧): the price of good 𝑧 in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝜌 = 𝑃2𝑃1: (expected) inflation rate (plus one). 𝑊: nominal wage rate. 𝑅: unemployment benefit for an unemployed consumer. 𝑅 = 𝐷. ?̂?: consumption basket in the childhood period of a next generation consumer. 𝑄: pay-as-you-go pension for a consumer of the older generation. Θ: tax payment by an employed consumer for the unemployment benefit. ?̂?: pay-as-you-go pension for a consumer of the younger generation when he retires. Ψ: tax payment by an employed consumer for the pay-as-you-go pension. Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer. 𝑙: labor supply of an individual. Γ(𝑙): disutility function of labor, which is increasing and convex. 𝐿: total employment. 𝐿𝑓: population of labor or employment in the full-employment state.  𝑦(𝐿𝑙): labor productivity, which is increasing or decreasing or constant 
     with respect to “employment × labor supply” (𝐿𝑙). 
 
 
 
 We assume that the population 𝐿𝑓 is constant. In our model there is no capital, and the interest rate 
is zero. 
 We consider a two-step method to solve utility maximization of consumers such that:   
 1.  Employed and unemployed consumers maximize their utility by determining consumption 
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baskets in Periods 1 and 2 given their income over two periods:  
 2.  Then, they maximize their consumption baskets given the expenditure in each period.  
 We define the elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to “employment × labor supply” as 
follows,  𝜁 = 𝑦′𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝐿𝑙 . 
We assume that −1 < 𝜁 < 1, and 𝜁 is constant. Increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale 
means 𝜁 > 0 (𝜁 < 0 or 𝜁 = 0). 
 Since the taxes for unemployed consumers’ debts are paid by employed consumers of the same 
generation, 𝐷 and Θ satisfy the following relationship.  
 𝐷(𝐿𝑓 − 𝐿) = 𝐿Θ. 
This means  
 𝐿(𝐷 + Θ) = 𝐿𝑓𝐷. 
 The price of the consumption basket in Period 0 is assumed to be 1. Thus, 𝐷 is the real value of 
the consumption in the childhood period of consumers. 
 Since the taxes for the pay-as-you-go pension system are paid by employed consumers of younger 
generation, 𝑄 and Ψ satisfy the following relationship:  
 𝐿Ψ = 𝐿𝑓𝑄. 
The utility function of employed consumers of one generation over three periods is written as  
 𝑢(𝐶1𝑒 , 𝐶2𝑒 , 𝐷) − Γ(𝑙). 
We assume that 𝑢(⋅) is a homothetic utility function. The utility function of unemployed consumers 
is  
 𝑢(𝐶1𝑢, 𝐶2𝑢, 𝐷). 
The consumption baskets of employed and unemployed consumers in Period 𝑖 are  
 𝐶𝑖𝑒 = (∫10 𝑐𝑖𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 , 𝑖 = 1,2, 
and  
 𝐶𝑖𝑢 = (∫10 𝑐𝑖𝑢(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 , 𝑖 = 1,2. 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution among the goods, and 𝜎 > 1. 
 The price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖 is  
 𝑃𝑖 = (∫10 𝑝𝑖(𝑧)1−𝜎𝑑𝑧) 11−𝜎 , 𝑖 = 1,2. 
The budget constraint for en employed consumer is  
 𝑃1𝐶1𝑒 + 𝑃2𝐶2𝑒 = 𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?̂? − Ψ. 
Employed consumers of the younger generation lend money to consumers in the childhood period 
of the next generation. It is repaid in the next period. The budget constraint for en unemployed 
consumer is  
 𝑃1𝐶1𝑢 + 𝑃2𝐶2𝑢 = Π − 𝐷 + 𝑅 + ?̂? 
Since 𝑅 = 𝐷,  
 𝑃1𝐶1𝑢 + 𝑃2𝐶2𝑢 = Π+ ?̂?. 
Let  
 𝛼 = 𝑃1𝐶1𝑒𝑃1𝐶1𝑒+𝑃2𝐶2𝑒 , 1 − 𝛼 = 𝑃2𝐶2𝑒𝑃1𝐶1𝑒+𝑃2𝐶2𝑒. (1) 
 Since the utility functions 𝑢(𝐶1𝑒 , 𝐶2𝑒 , 𝐷) and 𝑢(𝐶1𝑢, 𝐶2𝑢, 𝐷) are homothetic, 𝛼 is determined by the 
relative price 𝑃2𝑃1, and do not depend on the income of the consumers. Therefore, we have  
 𝛼 = 𝑃1𝐶1𝑒𝑃1𝐶1𝑒+𝑃2𝐶2𝑒 = 𝑃1𝐶1𝑢𝑃1𝐶1𝑢+𝑃2𝐶2𝑢, 
 
 1 − 𝛼 = 𝑃2𝐶2𝑒𝑃1𝐶1𝑒+𝑃2𝐶2𝑒 = 𝑃2𝐶2𝑢𝑃1𝐶1𝑢+𝑃2𝐶2𝑢, 
From the budget constraints for employed and unemployed consumers we obtain the following 
demand functions for consumption baskets.  
 𝐶1𝑒 = 𝛼𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃1 , 𝐶2𝑒 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃2 , 
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and  
 𝐶1𝑢 = 𝛼 Π+?̂?𝑃1 , 𝐶2𝑢 = (1 − 𝛼) Π+?̂?𝑃2 . 
Lagrange functions in the second step for employed and unemployed consumers are  
 ℒ1𝑒 = (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 (2) 
 −𝜆1𝑒 [∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?̂? − Ψ)], 
  
 ℒ2𝑒 = (∫10 𝑐2𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 
 −𝜆2𝑒 [∫10 𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐2𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?̂? − Ψ)], 
  
 ℒ1𝑢 = (∫10 𝑐1𝑢(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 − 𝜆1𝑢 [∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑢(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?̂?)], 
 and  
 ℒ2𝑢 = (∫10 𝑐2𝑢(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 − 𝜆2𝑢 [∫10 𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐2𝑢(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?̂?)]. 
 𝜆1𝑒, 𝜆2𝑒, 𝜆1𝑢 and 𝜆2𝑢 are Lagrange multipliers. Solving these maximization problems, the following 
demand functions of employed and unemployed consumers are derived.  
 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧) = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ)𝑃1 , 
  
 𝑐2𝑒(𝑧) = (𝑝2(𝑧)𝑃2 )−𝜎 (1−𝛼)(𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ)𝑃2 , 
  
 𝑐1𝑢(𝑧) = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝛼(Π+?̂?)𝑃1 , 
 and  
 𝑐2𝑢(𝑧) = (𝑝2(𝑧)𝑃2 )−𝜎 (1−𝛼)(Π+?̂?)𝑃2 . 
About some calculations of these maximization problems please see Appendix. From these analyses 
we obtain the indirect utility functions of employed and unemployed consumers as follows:  
 𝑉𝑒 = 𝑢 (𝛼𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃1 , (1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃2 , 𝐷) − Γ(𝑙), 
and  
 𝑉𝑢 = 𝑢 (𝛼 Π+?̂?𝑃1 , (1 − 𝛼) Π+?̂?𝑃2 , 𝐷). 
 Let  
 𝜔 = 𝑊𝑃1 , 𝜌 = 𝑃2𝑃1. 
Then, since 𝐷 is constant, we can write  
 𝑉𝑒 = 𝜑 (𝜔𝑙 + Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃1 , 𝜌) − Γ(𝑙), 
  
 𝑉𝑢 = 𝜑 (Π+?̂?𝑃1 , 𝜌), 𝜔 is the real wage rate. Denote  
 𝐼 = 𝜔𝑙 + Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃1 . (3) 
The condition for maximization of 𝑉𝑒 with respect to 𝑙 given 𝜌 is  
 
𝜕𝜑𝜕𝐼 𝜔 − Γ′(𝑙) = 0, (4) 
where  
 
𝜕𝜑𝜕𝐼 = 𝛼 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝐶1𝑒 + (1 − 𝛼) 𝜕𝑢𝜕𝐶2𝑒. 
Given 𝑃1 and 𝜌 the labor supply is a function of 𝜔. From (4) we get  
 
𝑑𝑙𝑑𝜔 = 𝜕𝜑𝜕𝐼+𝜕2𝜑𝜕𝐼2𝜔𝑙Γ′′(𝑙)−𝜕2𝜑𝜕𝐼2𝜔2. (5) 
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If 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝜔 > 0, the labor supply is increasing with respect to the real wage rate 𝜔. 
 
2.2  Firms 
 
 Let 𝑑1(𝑧) be the total demand for good 𝑧 by younger generation consumers in Period 1. Then,  
 𝑑1(𝑧) = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙+𝐿𝑓Π−𝐿𝐷−𝐿Θ+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿Ψ)𝑃1 = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙+𝐿𝑓Π−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)𝑃1 . 
This is the sum of the demand of employed and unemployed consumers. Note that ?̂? is the pay-as-
you-go pension for younger generation consumers in their Period 2. Similarly, their total demand for 
good 𝑧 in Period 2 is written as  
 𝑑2(𝑧) = (𝑝2(𝑧)𝑃2 )−𝜎 (1−𝛼)(𝑊𝐿𝑙+𝐿𝑓Π−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)𝑃2 . 
Let 𝑑2(𝑧) be the demand for good 𝑧 by the older generation. Then,  
 𝑑2(𝑧) = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 (1−?̅?)(?̅??̅?𝑙+̅𝐿𝑓Π̅−𝐿𝑓?̅?+𝐿𝑓𝑄−𝐿𝑓?̅?)𝑃1 , 
where ?̅?, Π̅, ?̅?, 𝑙,̅ ?̅? and ?̅? are the nominal wage rate, the profits of firms, the employment, the 
individual labor supply, the debt of an individual, and the pay-as-you-go pension, respectively, during 
the previous period. ?̅? is the value of 𝛼 for the older generation. 𝑄 is the pay-as-you-go pension 
for consumers of the older generation themselves. Let  
 𝑀 = (1 − ?̅?)(?̅??̅?𝑙 ̅ + 𝐿𝑓Π̅ − 𝐿𝑓?̅? + 𝐿𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿𝑓?̅?). 
This is the total savings or the total consumption of the older generation consumers including the pay-
as-you-go pensions that they receive in their Period 2. It is the planned consumption that is 
determined in Period 1 of the older generation consumers. Net savings is the difference between 𝑀 
and the pay-as-you-go pensions in their Period 2, as follows:  
 𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄. 
 Their demand for good 𝑧 is written as (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝑀𝑃1. Government expenditure constitutes the national 
income as well as the consumptions of the younger and older generations. Then, the total demand 
for good 𝑧 is written as  
 𝑑(𝑧) = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝑌𝑃1, (6) 
 where 𝑌 is the effective demand defined by  
 𝑌 = 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄) + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? + 𝑀. 
Note that ?̂?  is consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer. 𝐺  is the 
government expenditure, except for the pay-as-you-go pensions, scholarships and unemployment 
benefits (see Otaki (2007), (2015) about this demand function). Now, we assume that 𝐺 is financed 
by seigniorage similarly to Otaki (2007), (2009). In a later section, we will consider the government’s 
budget constraint with respect to taxes. 
 Let 𝐿  and 𝐿𝑙  be employment and the “employment ×  labor supply” of firm 𝑧 . The total 
employment and the total “employment × labor supply” are also  
 ∫10 𝐿𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿, ∫10 𝐿𝑙𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿𝑙. 
The output of firm 𝑧 is 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙). At the equilibrium 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑑(𝑧). Then, we have  
 
𝜕𝑑(𝑧)𝜕(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′. 
From (6)  
 
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)𝜕𝑑(𝑧) = − 𝑝1(𝑧)𝜎𝑑(𝑧). 
Thus  
 
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)𝜕(𝐿𝑙) = − 𝑝1(𝑧)(𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′)𝜎𝑑(𝑧) = − 𝑝1(𝑧)(𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′)𝜎𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) . 
The profit of firm 𝑧 is  
 𝜋(𝑧) = 𝑝1(𝑧)𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿𝑙𝑊. 
The condition for profit maximization is  
 
𝜕𝜋(𝑧)𝜕(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑝1(𝑧)(𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′) − 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) 𝑝1(𝑧)(𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′)𝜎𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) −𝑊 
 = 𝑝1(𝑧)(𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′) − 𝑝1(𝑧)(𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′)𝜎 −𝑊 = 0. 
Therefore, we obtain  
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 𝑝1(𝑧) = 1(1−1𝜎)(1+𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑊. 
Let 𝜇 = 1𝜎. Then,  
 𝑝1(𝑧) = 1(1−𝜇)(1+𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑊. 
This means that the real wage rate is  
 𝜔 = (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙). (7) 
With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale, 𝜔 is increasing (decreasing or constant) 
with respect to “employment × labor supply” 𝐿𝑙. 
 From (3), (4) and (7), we have  
 
𝜕𝜑𝜕𝐼 (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − Γ′(𝑙) = 0, 
with  
 𝐼 = (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙 + Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ𝑃1 . 
Then, from (5)  
 
𝑑𝑙𝑑(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝜔 𝑑𝜔𝑑(𝐿𝑙) = [𝜕𝜑𝜕𝐼+𝜕2𝜑𝜕𝐼2 (1−𝜇)(1+𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙](1−𝜇)(1+𝜁)𝑦′Γ′′(𝑙)−𝜕2𝜑𝜕𝐼2 [(1−𝜇)(1+𝜁)𝑦′]2 . 
Assuming 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝜔 > 0 , with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale 𝑦′ > 0  (𝑦 < 0 ), this is positive 
(negative). Since  
 
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)𝑑𝐿 = 𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝐿, (8) 
we have 
 
𝑑𝑙𝑑𝐿 = 𝑑𝑙𝑑(𝐿𝑙) 𝑑(𝐿𝑙)𝑑𝐿 = (𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝐿) 𝑑𝑙𝑑(𝐿𝑙). 
Thus,  
 
𝑑𝑙𝑑𝐿 = 𝑙1−𝐿 𝑑𝑙𝑑(𝐿𝑙) 𝑑𝑙𝑑(𝐿𝑙). 
Usually 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝐿 and 𝑑𝑙𝑑(𝐿𝑙) have the same sign, and we assume 𝑑(𝐿𝑙)𝑑𝐿 > 0 in (8). Also, since −1 < 𝜁 < 1, 
we have  
 
𝑑(𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙))𝐿𝑙 = 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′ = 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)(1 + 𝜁) > 0.  
Then, the output 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increases by an increase in 𝐿. 
Since all firms are symmetric,  
 𝑃1 = 𝑝1(𝑧) = 1(1−𝜇)(1+𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑊. (9) 
2.3  Involuntary unemployment 
 
 The (nominal) aggregate supply of the goods is equal to  
 𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝑓Π = 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙). 
The (nominal) aggregate demand is  
 𝛼(𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄) + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? + 𝑀 
 = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? + 𝑀. 
Since they are equal,  
          𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? + 𝑀,               
or  
 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝐺+𝐿𝑓?̂?+𝑀1−𝛼 . 
In real terms  
 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝐺+𝐿𝑓?̂?+𝑀(1−𝛼)𝑃1 , (10) 
or  
 𝐿𝑙 = 𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝐺+𝐿𝑓?̂?+𝑀(1−𝛼)𝑃1𝑦(𝐿𝑙) . 
 11−𝛼 is a multiplier. From (4) and (5) the individual labor supply 𝑙 is a (usually increasing) function of 𝜔 . From (7) 𝜔  is a function of 𝐿𝑙 . With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale 
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technology it is increasing (decreasing or constant) with respect to 𝐿𝑙 or with respect to 𝐿 given 𝑙. 
The individual labor supply 𝑙 may be increasing or decreasing in 𝐿 or 𝐿𝑙. However, we assume that 𝐿𝑙 is increasing in 𝐿. This requires  
 
𝑑𝐿𝑙𝑑𝐿 = 𝑙 + 𝑑𝑙𝑑𝐿 > 0. 
It means 𝐿𝑙 < 𝐿𝑓𝑙 for 𝐿 < 𝐿𝑓. The equilibrium value of 𝐿𝑙 cannot be larger than 𝐿𝑓𝑙. However, it may 
be strictly smaller than 𝐿𝑓𝑙. Then, we have 𝐿 < 𝐿𝑓 and involuntary umemployment exists. 
 If the government collects a lump-sum tax 𝑇  from the younger generation consumers, the 
aggregate supply and demand satisfy 
 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? + 𝑀.             (11) 
 
2.4  Discussion summary 
 
 The real wage rate depends on the elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to “employment × labor supply” and the employment level. But the employment level does not depend on the real 
wage rate. The real aggregate demand and the employment level are determined by the value of  
 
𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝐺+𝐿𝑓?̂?+𝑀𝑃1 . (12) 
If the employment is smaller than the labor population, then involuntary unemployment exists. 
 
2.5 Positive and negative real balance effects 
 
 The net savings of the older generation consumers is the difference between their savings and ther 
pay-as-you-go pensions. It is written as 𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄. 
On the other hand, the debts of the younger generation consumers is 𝐿𝑓𝐷. There are two cases 
about the relation between 𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄 and 𝐿𝑓𝐷 as follows: 
1. Case 1: 𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄 > 𝐿𝑓𝐷 , that is, 𝑀 > 𝐿𝑓𝑄 + 𝐿𝑓𝐷 . Then, the net savings of the older 
generation consumers is larger than the debts of consumers in the childhood period. In this 
case the real balance effect due to a decline in the price of the goods is positive. 
2. Case 2: 𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄 < 𝐿𝑓𝐷 , that is, 𝑀 < 𝐿𝑓𝑄 + 𝐿𝑓𝐷 . Then, the net savings of the older 
generation consumers is smaller than the debts of consumers in the childhood period. In this 
case the real balance effect due to a decline in the price of the goods is negative. 
We will show that in Section 3. 
 
2.6  The case of full-employment 
 
 If 𝐿𝑙 = 𝐿𝑓𝑙, full-employment is achieved. Then, (10) is re-written as  
 𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) = 𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝐺+𝐿𝑓?̂?+𝑀(1−𝛼)𝑃1 . (13) 
Since 𝐿𝑓 and 𝐿𝑓𝑙 are constant (if 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑓, 𝜔 is constant), this is an identity not an equation. On the 
other hand, (10) is an equation not an identity. (13) should be written as  
 
𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓?̂?−𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝐺+𝐿𝑓?̂?+𝑀(1−𝛼)𝑃1 ≡ 𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙). 
This yields:  
 𝑃1 = 1(1−𝛼)𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) [𝛼(−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄) + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓?̂? + 𝑀]. 
Then, the nominal wage rate is determined by:  
 𝑊 = (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙)𝑃1. 
 
3  Steady state with ongoing nominal wage rate decline and achievement of full-
employment 
 
3. 1 Steady state with ongoing nominal wage rate decline 
 
If there exists involuntary unemployment, the nominal wage rate may decline. By (9) a decline in the 
nominal wage rate induces a decline in the price of the goods. We assume that consumers correctly 
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predict a decline in the price. Suppose that the output and the employment are constant, and the 
price of the goods declines at the rate 𝜌 − 1 < 0 from a period to the next period. Let 𝑇 be the tax 
revenue. We can assume that ?̂? = 𝜌𝐷 and ?̂? = 𝜌𝑄. Thus, (11) is written as  
 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺 + 𝜌𝐿𝑓𝐷 +𝑀. (14) 
In order to maintain the steady state, the total savings of the younger generation consumers including 
the pay-as-you-go pension that they will receive must be equal to 𝜌𝑀. Therefore,  
 (1 − 𝛼)[𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] = 𝐺 − 𝑇 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓(𝐷 + 𝑄) +𝑀 = 𝜌𝑀. (15) 
This means 
 𝐺 − 𝑇 = (𝜌 − 1)(𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄). (16) 
We obtain the following prosposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
There are two cases. 
1. If 𝑀 > 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄, that is, in the positive real balance effect case, in order to maintain the 
steady state where the output and the employment are constant with falling prices (𝜌 < 1), a 
budget surplus  𝐺 − 𝑇 < 0 is required. 
2. If 𝑀 < 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄, that is, in the negative real balance effect case, in order to maintain the 
steady state where the output and the employment are constant with falling prices (𝜌 < 1), a 
budget deficit  𝐺 − 𝑇 > 0 is required. 
  
3.2 Fiscal policy to achieve full-employment 
 
 Let 𝐺′ and 𝑇′ be the government expenditure and the tax to achieve full-employment. Then, (14) 
is written as  
 𝑃1𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) − 𝑇′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺′ + 𝜌𝐿𝑓𝐷 +𝑀. 
From this  
 (1 − 𝛼)[𝑃1𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) − 𝑇′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] = 𝐺′ − 𝑇′ + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓(𝐷 + 𝑄) +𝑀. (17) 
Suppose 𝑃1𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) − 𝑇′ > 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇, that is, the realization of full employment will increase 
consumers’ disposable income. Then, from (15) and (17) we get  
 𝐺′ − 𝑇′ > (𝜌 − 1)(𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄). 
Therefore, we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 2 
In order to achieve full-employment with ongoing nominal wage rate decline the budget surplus must 
be smaller, or the budget deficit must be larger than the steady state case in (16). 
 
 Let 𝐺′′, 𝑇′′, 𝑀′ and 𝑃1′ be the government expenditure, the tax revenue, the total savings of the 
younger generation consumers and the price of the consumption basket in the next period after 
realization of full-employment. (14) is written as  
 𝑃1′𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1′𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) − 𝑇′′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺′′ + 𝜌𝐿𝑓𝐷 +𝑀′. 
To maintain full-employment, the total savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-
go pension must be equal to 𝜌𝑀′. Then, we have  
 
(1 − 𝛼)[𝑃1′𝐿𝑓𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑓𝑙) − 𝑇′′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] = 𝐺′′ − 𝑇′′ + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓(𝐷 + 𝑄) +𝑀′ = 𝜌𝑀′, 
and,  
 𝐺′′ − 𝑇′′ = (𝜌 − 1)(𝑀′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄). 
If the nominal wage rate and the price are constant after realization of full-employment, 𝜌 = 1. Then,  
 𝐺′′ − 𝑇′′ = 0. 
Therefore, we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 3 
If the nominal wage rate is constant after full-employment has been realized, the balanced budget is 
required to maintain the steady state with full-employment. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
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 We have examined the existence of involuntary umemployment and the effects of fiscal policy using 
a three-periods OLG model under monopolistic competition with ongoing nominal wage rate decline. 
We considered the case of a divisible labor supply, and we assumed that the goods are produced 
only by labor. 
 In the future research, we want to analyze involuntary unemployment and fiscal policy in a situation 
where goods are produced by capital and labor, and there exist investments of firms. 
  
Appendix: Some calculations 
 
 The first order condition for (2) is  
 (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 1𝜎−1 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)−1𝜎 − 𝜆1𝑒𝑝1(𝑧) = 0. (A-1) 
From this  
 (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧)−1 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 = (𝜆1𝑒)1−𝜎𝑝1(𝑧)1−𝜎. 
Then,  
 (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧)−1 ∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧 = (𝜆1𝑒)1−𝜎 ∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)1−𝜎𝑑𝑧 = 1, 
It means  
 𝜆1𝑒 (∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)1−𝜎𝑑𝑧) 11−𝜎 = 1, 
and so  
 𝑃1 = 1𝜆1𝑒. 
From (A-1)  
 (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 1𝜎−1 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 = 𝜆1𝑒𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑒(𝑧). 
Then,  
 (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 1𝜎−1 ∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧 = (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 
 = 𝐶1𝑒 = 𝜆1𝑒 ∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 1𝑃1 ∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧. 
Therefore,  
 ∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃1𝐶1𝑒 . 
Similarly,  
 ∫10 𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐2𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃2𝐶2𝑒 . 
Thus,  
 ∫10 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐2𝑒(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃1𝐶1𝑒 + 𝑃2𝐶2𝑒 = 𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?̂? − Ψ. 
From (A-1)  
 𝑃1𝐶1𝑒 = 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?̂? − Ψ). 
Also by (A-1)  
 (∫10 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑧) 𝜎𝜎−1 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)−1 = 𝐶1𝑒𝑐1𝑒(𝑧)−1 = (𝜆1𝑒)𝜎𝑝1(𝑧)𝜎 = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )𝜎 . 
From this we get  
 𝑐1𝑒(𝑧) = (𝑝1(𝑧)𝑃1 )−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝑙+Π−𝐷−Θ+?̂?−Ψ)𝑃1 . 𝑐2𝑒(𝑧), 𝑐1𝑢(𝑧) and 𝑐2𝑢(𝑧) are similarly obtained. 
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